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I. INTRODUCTION
Unreported criminal behavior is troubling for a variety of reasons,
including the likelihood that it reduces the law’s ability to deter
wrongdoing. This is especially unfortunate in the case of sexual as-
sault and other wrongs where the wrongdoers are often repeat offend-
ers who will harm others until apprehended.1 In many cases, these
† Roscoe Pound, a native of Lincoln, Nebraska, is widely considered to be one of the
early giants of American legal thought. He began his legal career practicing law
in his hometown, later joining the faculty at the University of Nebraska College
of Law. In 1903, Pound became dean, a role he would fill until 1910. While the
dean at Nebraska Law, Pound delivered his famous address to the American Bar
Association, “Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Jus-
tice,” a speech that prompted a widespread reexamination of the nature of our
legal system. Pound left Nebraska Law in 1910 to teach at Harvard Law, where
he became dean in 1916. Scholars claim that Pound is one of the greatest legal
minds of his time and still refer to his writings today. In 1949, the Nebraska
State Bar Association funded a lectureship in Pound’s honor. “New Paths of
Law,” the first Pound Lecture, was delivered in 1950 by Roscoe Pound himself.
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW. If you would like to submit a re-
sponse to this Article in the Nebraska Law Review Bulletin, contact our Online
Editor at lawrev@unl.edu.
* Thanks to our colleague, Jonathan Masur, for helpful comments and also to
faculty members and students at the University of Nebraska College of Law for
their gracious hospitality alongside their suggestions and insightful objections to
the ideas discussed here and first presented as a Pound Lecture in March 2018.
1. Of course the most familiar cases are those where there was reporting that went
unheeded. The best known of these are that of physician Larry Nassar and for-
mer Penn State football coach Jerry Sandusky. Accounts which became public
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assaults take place over many years so it is especially easy to see why
early reporting could prevent many subsequent harms.2 One approach
to the problem of wrongdoers who are difficult to apprehend, and thus
long after the facts suggest that Nassar molested at least 256 young women while
practicing sports medicine for Michigan State University and the USA Gymnas-
tics national team. Neither victims nor parents (who were often in the room
where Nassar treated the women) reported the abuse to law enforcement, and we
now know it is likely that both the University and USA Gymnastics officials en-
gaged in a cover-up. See Marisa Kwiatkowski et al., A Blind Eye to Sex Abuse:
How USA Gymnastics Failed to Report Cases, INDYSTAR (Aug. 4, 2016), https://
www.indystar.com/story/news/investigations/2016/08/04/usa-gymnastics-sex-ab
use-protected-coaches/85829732/ [https://perma.unl.edu/XG7Q-SWBR] (last up-
dated Jan. 31, 2018); Stephanie Saul, Calls Grow for Michigan State University
President to Resign Over Nassar Case, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www
.nytimes.com/2018/01/19/us/michigan-state-nassar.html. Reports indicate that he
could have been stopped at many points. Moreover, at least one investigation
shows that the university as a whole engaged in suppression of information about
sexual violence in several of its sports programs. See Paula Lavigne & Nicole
Noren, OTL: Michigan State Secrets Extend Far Beyond Larry Nassar Case,
ESPN (Feb. 1, 2018), http://www.espn.com/espn/story/_/id/22214566/pattern-deni
al-inaction-information-suppression-michigan-state-goes-larry-nassar-case-espn
[https://perma.unl.edu/E8X6-X79P]. Similarly, Jerry Sandusky was found guilty
of multiple counts of child sexual assault in 2012, with known instances of abuse
occurring between 1998 and 2001. See FREEH SPORKIN & SULLIVAN, LLP, REPORT
OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL REGARDING THE ACTIONS OF THE PENN-
SYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY RELATED TO THE CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE COMMITTED BY
GERALD A. SANDUSKY 13, 19–25 (2012). University officials failed to investigate
claims of abuse raised throughout this period, and they concealed Sandusky’s of-
fenses from authorities and the public. Id. at 14. One of us has her own “MeToo”
tale: in 2016, Martha Nussbaum revealed events that happened to her in 1968.
Martha C. Nussbaum, Why Some Men Are Above the Law, HUFFINGTON POST
(Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/martha-c-nussbaum/why-some-
men-are-above-the-law_b_8992754.html [https://perma.unl.edu/X24V-M5J4]
(last updated Jan. 15, 2017). Meanwhile, the perpetrator went unchallenged and
may well have harmed others. Nussbaum discusses the development of law to-
ward greater accountability in her essay Accountability in an Era of Celebrity, in
IDEAS THAT MATTER: DEMOCRACY, JUSTICE, RIGHTS (Debra Satz & Annabelle
Lever eds., Oxford Univ. Press) (forthcoming 2019).
2. Recent claims against an Alabama politician and judge, Roy Moore, suggest re-
peated sexual assaults over two decades, some twenty to forty years in the past.
See Michal Kranz, All the Women Who Have Accused Roy Moore of Sexual Mis-
conduct, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 4, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/women-ac
cused-roy-moore-sexual-misconduct-list-2017-11 [https://perma.unl.edu/T3NB-5P
9F]; Stephanie McCrummen et al., Woman Says Roy Moore Initiated Sexual En-
counter When She Was 14, He Was 32, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/investigations/woman-says-roy-moore-initiated-sexual-en
counter-when-she-was-14-he-was-32/2017/11/09/1f495878-c293-11e7-afe9-4f60b5
a6c4a0_story.html [https://perma.unl.edu/5GRD-GZMM]. Neither the victims nor
their parents reported the abuse at the time. Id. The fact that the accusations
were so delayed caused credibility problems when these victims came forward in
2017. See, e.g., Michael D. Shear & Alan Blinder, Trump Defends Roy Moore,
Citing Candidate’s Denial of Sexual Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/21/us/politics/roy-moore-trump-alabama.html.
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apparently undeterred by tort and criminal law, is to alter the law’s
approach, perhaps by focusing less on deterrence and more on educa-
tion, or on separating populations from which offenders and victims
are likely to be drawn.3 Another is to double down on deterrence by
raising the penalty for those who are caught and convicted.4 The de-
terrence approach is difficult and often counterproductive where there
is some doubt about culpability or where the factfinder and adjudica-
tor have limited power, as in the case of wrongs committed on univer-
sity campuses and in many workplaces. Our focus here is on sexual
misdeeds on college campuses, but much of the analysis is easily ap-
plied to plagiarism and to various wrongs committed in the workplace.
Some of the ideas offered here can be applied to crimes more gener-
ally, but it is useful to begin with wrongs that are judged by something
less than a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. In the case of sexual
assault on campuses, for instance, consent and other defenses may be
contestable, and fact-finding as well as remedies are in the hands of
private parties and often subject to a more-likely-than-not standard.5
Indeed, the terms that are used distinguish the matter from criminal
law; the accused may be “held responsible” rather than “convicted,”
though the matter can also be investigated in the criminal law system.
In the workplace, an employer’s suspicion about sexual misbehavior or
embezzlement may be judged by a standard that is even lower; report-
ing is surely valuable to these employers as well as to fellow workers.
An employer who thinks someone may have embezzled is unlikely to
promote that person and is disinclined to bring in the police. In all
these settings, the traditional tort system is also inadequate or inap-
propriate; the evidence may be insufficient to meet its standard, it is
slow and expensive, and it often demoralizes other employees or
students.
3. Many universities have taken this approach, choosing to ban contact between the
accused and the accuser in cases of sexual misconduct allegations. See, e.g., U. of
Chi., No Contact Directives, UMATTER (2018), https://umatter.uchicago.edu/navi
gate-the-process/no-contact-directives/ [https://perma.unl.edu/YL4K-MKDM]
(stating that the “University may . . . require a respondent to leave a place where
a complainant is present”).
4. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, in ESSAYS IN
THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 1–54 (Gary S. Becker & William M.
Landes eds., 1974).
5. See HEATHER M. KARJANE ET AL., CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT: HOW AMERICA’S INSTI-
TUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION RESPOND 120 (2002); see also generally U.S. DEP’T
EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER 11 (Apr. 4, 2011),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf [https://per
ma.unl.edu/SS3E-WVHQ] (“[P]reponderance of the evidence is the appropriate
standard for investigating allegations of sexual harassment or violence.”), re-
scinded by U.S. DEP’T EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Q&A ON CAMPUS SEXUAL
MISCONDUCT 5 (Sept. 2017), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-ti
tle-ix-201709.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/2UV8-4738].
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The danger of upsetting the lives of victims and accused persons
may of course be offset by the gains that are available only from en-
couraging victims to report assaults and other injuries, not to mention
identifying the wrongdoers who caused them. When the tort system
comes into play, it often does so because victims are motivated to bring
suit by the monetary damages they can expect. This is less so for vic-
tims of sexual misconduct because they are unlikely to be able to show
the sort of losses that the law compensates; emotional loss standing
alone is traditionally uncompensated.6 The exceptions to this observa-
tion are noteworthy but do not detract from the proposal offered here.
Many of the exceptional cases involve celebrities who have reason to
offer substantial monetary settlements or who are pursued in court to
the bitter end. For example, one of Bill Cosby’s accusers received a
sizable settlement.7 At times, even universities pay out. The accuser
of football star Jameis Winston received close to one million dollars
from Florida State University.8 Cases with such payouts appear to be
exceptional, but they can be used to taint the complaints of women
who accuse celebrities of wrongdoing. Indeed, in Cosby’s second trial,
the defense sought (unsuccessfully) to portray the accuser as a greedy
extortionist.9 In any event, when a case is settled, the settlement is
likely to include a nondisclosure provision, and the obliviousness of
the authorities eliminates a chance to take steps that will prevent fu-
ture harms.10 In almost all these cases, whether in the criminal law
process, in university settings, or in the workplace, victims have little
to gain and much to lose when they set an inquiry in motion. One who
reports a wrong committed within a community risks ostracism and
retaliation and surely faces months of distraction and pain, beginning
with expressions of disbelief by some of those who learn of the accusa-
tion. This is especially so in a university community and where sexual
misconduct is concerned. What ought to be regarded as heroism is
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (AM. LAW INST. 1979); Margaret J. Radin,
Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56, 70 (1993) (noting that
the “traditional legal position on pain and suffering” in tort law is “committed to
incommensurability”).
7. Graham Bowley & Jon Hurdle, Bill Cosby Paid His Sex Assault Accuser $3.38
Million in Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
04/09/arts/cosby-trial-juror-protest.html (describing Cosby’s initial settlement
payment to accuser Andrea Constand, who was ultimately successful in a second
suit against the entertainer).
8. See Marc Tracy, Florida State Settles Suit Over Jameis Winston Rape Inquiry,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/26/sports/football/
florida-state-to-pay-jameis-winstons-accuser-950000-in-settlement.html.
9. See, e.g., Defendant’s Opposition to Commonwealth’s Motion in Limine to Admit
Evidence of Settlement Negotiations from Constand v. Cosby at 7, Pennsylvania
v. William H. Cosby, Jr., No. CP-46-CR-0003932-2016 (Pa. Ct. C.P., Montgomery
Cty., Crim. Div., filed Mar. 3, 2018).
10. See Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan, Semi-Confidential Settlements in Civil, Crimi-
nal, and Sexual Assault Cases, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 311, 326–27 (2018).
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often treated as contemptible behavior, as if the victim is nothing
more than a snitch who has violated the informal rules of partying,
social drinking, collegiality, or dating. In the workplace, a victim who
reports an assault or other wrongdoing often escapes unwanted atten-
tion by moving to another place of employment and, in any event, is
unlikely to be rewarded by her employer and co-workers. In this Arti-
cle we suggest, or at least explore, a means of encouraging reports.
The primary goal is to prevent wrongdoing in the first place.
Alongside the aim of preventing wrongs lie other goals. The first is
to offer justice to both victim and accuser. The victim of sexual miscon-
duct will normally want to see the perpetrator identified and held ac-
countable, and she may simply wish to be heard. Accountability will
also serve to deter future offenders, to express evolving social norms,
and to educate society (or students and employees when the case is on
a university campus) about these norms. The victim is entitled not
simply to be heard but also to be respected and believed when the
claim is credible and there is no contrary evidence or credible defense.
Unless there is good reason for an exception, the victim is also entitled
to privacy; there is rarely a need to inquire about past sexual behavior
or to make public the current claim. Privacy is not only fair to the
victim (unless she wishes to go public), but it also makes future re-
ports by other victims more likely, and thus serves to deter wrongdo-
ing. Any proposal for reform in this area needs to account for the
values of privacy and dignity, and more generally to ask whether a
proposed change will encourage or discourage reports of wrongdoing.
It must be emphasized that one victim’s courageous complaint
helps multiple future and potential victims. It may do so because the
accused is a serial perpetrator or because it encourages other women
to report and to seek justice. Even as we respect the inclination of
some women to get on with their lives and to avoid entanglement with
factfinders and hearings, we must think of the benefits of their coming
forward. It is here that our proposal makes a novel contribution.
At the same time, society has its familiar interest in preventing
innocent people from being damaged. A large and well-known debate
has arisen about the correct standard of proof in university tribunals
conducted under Title IX.11 A beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard is
one familiar means of protecting the accused, but a preponderance-of-
the-evidence standard has been pushed into use in university cases in
the interest of safety, and in part because the accused may be
threatened with expulsion from a university but not with prison or
11. See, e.g., Brett A. Sokolow, ATIXA Guide to Choosing Between Preponderance of
the Evidence v. Clear and Convincing Evidence, ATIXA: ASS’N OF TITLE IX ADMIN-
ISTRATORS (Sept. 22, 2017), https://atixa.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/
09/ATIXA-Guide-to-Choosing-Between-Preponderance-of-the-Evidence-v.-Clear-
and-Convincing-Evidence-9.22.17.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/2XPK-6VCM].
612 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:607
anything of that kind. We do not comment on this debate here. It is
not clear what the standard is in cases such as plagiarism or accusa-
tions of unwarranted damage to university property, though it is argu-
able that each university should simply choose the standard it finds
appropriate.12
II. REWARDING POTENTIAL ACCUSERS: A PROPOSED
MEANS OF REDUCING SEXUAL
ASSAULTS ON CAMPUS
This Article’s focus is on first-party reporting, but much of the
analysis can be applied to second and third-party reporting. The first
party is the person who suffers directly from an assault or other
wrongful behavior. In some cases, the first party is unable to make a
credible report because she (and here, for the sake of clarity, we con-
tinue to choose language that depicts the most common case, which is
that of a woman assaulted by a man, although there are of course
other configurations) has been disabled or threatened with further
harm—or may be under the influence of drugs (whether voluntarily or
involuntarily consumed) or alcohol and unable to recollect events pre-
cisely. But the first party may also prefer to put the event behind her;
she may fear disapproval or may be pained by repeated recollection or
questioning. For this and many other reasons,13 it is important to
value reporting by a second party—a term that describes someone
12. Violations of academic integrity policies are evaluated under a range of standards
of proof. See, e.g., Student Discipline Procedures, BYU LAW, https://law.byu.edu/
policies-and-procedures/general-policies/student-discipline-procedures/ [https://
perma.unl.edu/B75Q-K69X] (noting that the occurrence of plagiarism and the
student’s actual intent should be evaluated under different standards of proof);
Office of Student Rights and Responsibilities, Responding to Academic Dishon-
esty: A Guide for Faculty, PURDUE U., https://www.purdue.edu/odos/osrr/resour
ces/documents/responding_to_academic_dishonesty.html [https://perma.unl.edu/
SQ68-RZBK] (last updated Jan. 2014) (setting a standard of “preponderance of
the evidence” for findings of academic dishonesty); Code of Academic Integrity,
CORNELL U., https://cuinfo.cornell.edu/aic.cfm [https://perma.unl.edu/7PW7-JKU
T] (setting a standard of “clear and convincing evidence” for findings of academic
dishonesty); Guidelines Addressing Cheating and Plagiarism, COLL. OF SAN MA-
TEO, http://collegeofsanmateo.edu/academicpolicies/cheatingandplagiarism.asp
[https://perma.unl.edu/5KWV-D5WT] (setting a standard of “beyond a reasonable
doubt” for findings of academic dishonesty).
13. The first party may fear shame and disbelief or may worry that she will be per-
ceived as putting herself in a position to be assaulted. She may fear that disclo-
sure will limit or impede relationships or opportunities with others. Similarly,
she may fear that she will be perceived as a victim, liar, or extortionist. See, e.g.,
Kate B. Wolitzky-Taylor et al., Is Reporting of Rape on the Rise? A Comparison of
Women with Reported Versus Unreported Rape Experiences in the National Wo-
men’s Study-Replication, 26(4) J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 807, 809, 817 (2011).
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who witnesses the event in question.14 Finally, reporting by a third
party may occur; this may be someone who heard from the victim in
the immediate aftermath of an assault or other wrongdoing, or it may
be a person who heard from the wrongdoer himself, perhaps as a boast
or as a malicious report. A report from the first kind of third party,
often referred to as an “outcry witness”—and in some cases one who
has a legal obligation to report observations15—may not be enough to
convict or penalize the wrongdoer, but it may provide sufficient evi-
dence to bring about precautions or a search for information from a
first or second-hand party, or from a surveillance camera.
Here, as in several other areas of law, an obvious question is why
law does not simply pay victims or second-hand observers to report
wrongdoing. The law pays non-victims to report tax cheats; the whis-
tle-blower may receive a share of the government’s gain (so the report-
ing must be successful).16 Other areas where law encourages
reporting include criminal law quite generally, where jailhouse in-
formers and conspirators often enjoy rewards, including reductions in
their sentences or promises of immunity from prosecution, but are
nevertheless often believed by prosecutors and juries.17 The major
problem with rewards, beyond any actual provable costs as offered in
some tort and contract cases, is that they can make reports less believ-
able because of the danger of false reporting, and even of moral hazard
where the government actually pays for information. It is noteworthy
that in most cases where law allows rewards to second and third-party
witnesses, further investigation and concrete evidence are readily
available.18 In the case of sexual assault, and in only some of these
14. For example, a graduate assistant, Michael McQueary, witnessed Jerry San-
dusky engaging in sexual activity with a young boy in university showers. Mc-
Queary informed head coach Joe Paterno, and his information was later matched
by victim reports. See FREEH SPORKIN & SULLIVAN, LLP, supra note 1, at 62.
15. Typically, legal obligations of this sort arise in cases of sexual abuse of minors,
elderly persons, or otherwise vulnerable adults. Some states, including Califor-
nia, have extended mandatory reporting to competent adults. See, e.g., CAL. PE-
NAL CODE § 11160 (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12A 1/2 (2018); 11 R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-37-13.3 (2018); see also generally Nat’l Ctr. Prosecution of Violence
Against Women, Reporting Requirements Related to Rape of Competent Adult
Victims, NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEY ASS’N (June 2016), http://ndaa.org/wp-content/
uploads/Rape-Reporting-Requirement-for-Competent-Adult-Victims_Compila
tion.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/69DB-43NQ] (describing the state-by-state re-
porting requirements associated with rape or sexual assault of competent adult
victims).
16. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b) (2012).
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 35(b); see generally Kylie N. Key et al., Beliefs About Secondary
Confession Evidence: A Survey of Laypeople and Defense Attorneys, 24 PSYCHOL.,
CRIME & L. 1 (2018) (finding that laypeople underestimate the persuasive effect
of secondary confessions on juror perceptions).
18. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9–27.430 (2018) (not-
ing that “strong corroboration for the cooperating defendant’s testimony” may be
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other contexts, rewards to claimants may likely encourage the friends
of one party or the other to express skepticism about the facts con-
tained in allegations of wrongdoing. Still, the suggestion in this Arti-
cle is that the problem of non-reporting is so great that some
experimentation with rewards is appropriate. False claims and other
potential problems are addressed in Part IV.
Before turning to financial incentives, it is useful to think about
other means of encouraging and appreciating those who report wrong-
doing. Someone who provides a social benefit by reporting a sexual
assault might be publicly celebrated. The analysis resembles that as-
sociated with a “duty to rescue.”19 A university, or the state, could
announce a date on which such heroes are celebrated, much as ath-
letic heroes and those who serve in the military during wartime are
often glorified, rather than given additional payments for their ex-
traordinary efforts. But this sort of public message and encourage-
ment runs the same risk of exacerbating the problem of disbelief:
heroism might be discounted if observers think that the actor was mo-
tivated by the prospect of receiving any reward at all. In addition, the
large number of assaults means that celebration and thanks will be
impersonal. Public acknowledgement also draws attention to those
who have reported wrongdoing, and these people may seek anonymity.
Indeed, the failure to report wrongdoing may be motivated by a desire
for anonymity. In contrast, the side effects of monetary payments are
likely to be positive. Moreover, these payments require a source of
funding, and thus are apt to impose costs on universities, employers,
and states—or on other parties who will be encouraged to develop sys-
tems that minimize assaults and other wrongs in the first place. Mon-
etary payment can therefore discourage wrongdoers, who will have a
greater fear that they will be reported, even as it preserves anonymity
for injured parties and encourages safer places of work and study. All
three of these ends are unlikely to be advanced by speeches and other
methods that strive to change social norms.
III. IMPLEMENTING A REWARD SYSTEM
Monetary rewards can come in a variety of forms and styles. We
propose an experiment which, if successful, might lead to a widely
adopted practice, in which universities promise to pay students who
report sexual misconduct, so long as the law or a third party then
essential in ensuring the testimony cannot be impeached by a favorable plea
agreement); Id. at 9–27.620 (noting that prosecutors should decide whether to
offer a non-prosecution agreement in return for cooperation only after weighing
the strength of corroborating evidence, among other factors).
19. See generally Saul Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and
Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirmative Obligations, 72 VA. L. REV. 879
(1986).
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finds the report credible, and the university or the criminal law sys-
tem did not previously know of this wrong. Each university would pay
for qualifying reports on its own campus.
A university might contract with a third party, such as a law firm
or professional investigator, to manage the reward system. This
outside party is able to develop a reputation for impartiality, and
might at the outset be selected in the manner that mediators and arbi-
trators are chosen. The parties select the outsider by agreement and if
they cannot do so, they appoint representatives or arbitrators who
then essentially choose a third party as a potential tiebreaker or as a
means of reaching a majority decision. We imagine a system in which
the outsider is, or over time acts as, an insurance company, and is
itself subject to review.
With a third party in place, a university could offer or require that
every woman, or every entering student, be given a kind of insurance
policy. The insurer promises to pay a specified sum if the insured is
assaulted on campus and brings a claim, or otherwise informs a desig-
nated authority, within one month of the occurrence. The claim must
be accepted, or largely found true, in order for the victim to collect the
promised payment.20 With this plan in place, the insurer has the in-
centive to investigate claims and build a history that identifies dan-
gerous people and searches for other indicators, such as particular
fraternities, that can be watched or avoided. It might recommend
avoidance strategies to the university or to the police. Through compe-
tition, insurers will increase or decrease the cost of insurance depend-
ing on the university’s experience and its willingness to undertake
suggested precautions. The insurer might offer discounts for various
policies even before it has experience with the particular insured cam-
pus. The process is familiar with respect to automobiles: different
model cars, and their accessories, are associated with different prices
for auto insurance, and consumers can learn of these price differen-
tials before purchasing a vehicle. In the case of assaults on a univer-
sity campus, the insurer or the university might at times declare that
there is an exclusion (which is to say no coverage) if a named person or
20. Although the majority of campus sexual misconduct involves assailants who are
known to their victims, current Title IX guidelines do not require victims to iden-
tify their assailant. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, RE-
VISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL
EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES 19 (2001); Nancy Chi
Cantalupo, “Decriminalizing” Campus Institutional Responses to Peer Sexual Vio-
lence, 38 J.C. & U.L. 481, 482–83 (2012). In cases where the reporter does not
remember, or wishes not to disclose, the identity of the assailant, institutions
may fear a higher instance of strategic false reporting. One way to combat these
false reports would be to offer a reporter a higher reward when she identifies the
wrongdoer. The university could still respond to a report with an unidentified
assailant by interviewing third parties or reviewing security camera footage,
while nevertheless encouraging identification.
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entity is unsupervised. It might, for example, require a fraternity to
reveal the fact that it is under this sort of exclusion and is under con-
stant observation or is simply regarded as unsafe. The shame factor
alone could deter misbehavior.
Precautionary policies are not limited to student behavior. The in-
surer can encourage the university to remove or not hire a given
faculty member, coach, or other individual whose history of unwanted
behavior has brought about prior credible claims. (Tenure can usually,
and sensibly, be removed only for severe misconduct, but sexual har-
assment and sexual assault have sometimes been found to meet that
standard.) In this manner, universities might choose employees as it
chooses automobiles: quality matters but so does cost. In the case
where the offender is a temporary employee or a graduate student
planning to seek employment, the scheme could suggest remedies spe-
cific to the wrongdoer; faculty could be told not to recommend the
wrongdoer for a job for a period of time during which some counseling
or rehabilitation is required. The scheme would also encourage the in-
surer as well as the university to learn more about available precau-
tions, including therapies, surveillance devices, restrictions on alcohol
usage, and mandatory police oversight at parties. Title IX remedies
already include alcohol counseling and other therapeutic interven-
tions, especially for cases where rehabilitation is anticipated.21
The payments suggested here have been fashioned in terms of in-
surance, but in no way are they meant as compensation for the harms
suffered by victims. A payment is surely not a bounty, but rather, a
reward meant to encourage early reporting in the interest of other wo-
men who might suffer in the future. A victim can protect against fu-
ture suffering by others if she reports the wrong she experienced, and
especially so if she identifies the wrongdoer. Note that if the victim
fears that a payment amounts to a form of restitution for something
that cannot be reduced to money, or she fears that she will be doubted
or diminished, she can decline to accept payment. Unfortunately, it is
hard for her to advertise that she declined payment, but at least the
committee that adjudicates her claim will know that she asked not to
21. Title IX guidelines only require that sanctions “enforce the school’s code of stu-
dent conduct while considering the impact of separating a student from her or his
education,” and that they remain “proportionate . . . to the violation.” See U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 6. Department of Jus-
tice data on campus sexual assault cases indicate that less than one-third of stu-
dents found responsible for assault are expelled, with schools demonstrating
willingness to pursue alternative outcomes such as reprimand, community ser-
vice, counseling, or suspension in many cases. See Tyler Kingkade, Fewer Than
One-Third of Campus Sexual Assault Cases Result in Expulsion, HUFFINGTON
POST (Sept. 29, 2014), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/29/campus-sexu
al-assault_n_5888742.html [https://perma.unl.edu/LEV2-2QR3] (last updated
Dec. 6, 2017).
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be rewarded for her testimony. Alternatively, she can ask that pay-
ment be made not to her but to a charitable entity or to a fund that
increases the payments made to other victims who choose to accept
payment. A decision by the victim (or second-hand party) to decline
payment—like anonymity regarding her identity—preserves the in-
centive effect on the university as well as the likelihood that it takes
steps to prevent misdeeds. The system can be designed to record such
uncompensated reports, and it can do so with or without identifying
the claimant. We suspect that most victims will prefer privacy, but the
argument for public celebration, though discussed and rejected
above,22 might call for less privacy rather than more.
A further advantage of this reward system is that early reporting
might prevent the unusual but important phenomenon of “mass hyste-
ria” reporting.23 This is a phenomenon best known in the area of child
abuse, where therapies purporting to uncover buried memories some-
times generate false accusations. It has also been identified in the case
of claims against priests about wrongs (allegedly) committed many
years earlier, in the complainant’s childhood.24 While we have every
reason to believe complainants who come forward even years after
they were assaulted by priests (particularly when many such claim-
ants allege wrongdoing by a particular priest), there is also reason to
be concerned about imagined harms. One or more complaints can lead
others to re-imagine the past, especially when details are suggested by
other complainants or by interviewers. Numerous allegations are
more believable when they are truly independent, not when subse-
quent complaints match those already heard and broadcast. Quick re-
porting will necessarily lower the opportunity for mass hysteria.25
22. See supra text accompanying note 13.
23. See generally Sivasankaran Balaratnasingam & Aleksandar Janca, Mass Hyste-
ria Revisited, 19(2) CURRENT OPINION PSYCHIATRY 171, 171–74 (2006).
24. See, e.g., David Foster, ‘Sexual-Abuse Hysteria’ Cited for Climate of Fear, L.A.
TIMES (Mar. 20, 1994), http://articles.latimes.com/1994-03-20/news/mn-36262_1_
sexual-abuse-priests-chicago-cardinal-joseph-bernardin [https://perma.unl.edu/
GE38-ZCA3] (describing false accusations against Cardinal Joseph Bernardin in
the 1990s). Other examples of modern mass hysteria reporting among adults in-
clude the prevalence of UFO abduction claims, which have been shown to in-
crease dramatically following allegations of abduction in popular media. Leonard
S. Newman & Roy F. Baumeister, Toward an Explanation of the UFO Abduction
Phenomenon: Hypnotic Elaboration, Extraterrestrial Sadomasochism, and Spuri-
ous Memories, 7 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 99, 102 (1996). Another well-known example
is the McCarthyism of the 1950s, in which public hysteria about the rise of com-
munism led to mass accusations and political oppression. Geoffrey R. Stone, Free
Speech in the Age of McCarthy: A Cautionary Tale, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1387, 1404
(2005).
25. See generally Newman & Baumeister, supra note 24; see also Michael Salter, Or-
ganised Child Sexual Abuse in the Media, in OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1 (Henry N. Pontell ed., 2017) (discussing
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Why not go further? It is easy to imagine a system where those
who fail to report owe a payment. The risk of liability would be low, as
it would normally be associated with some other observer coming for-
ward, but even a low risk of liability can encourage behavior of one
sort or another. This idea borrows from the doctrine of comparative
negligence in tort law, under which the injured victim has her recov-
ery reduced in proportion to her own fault and its contribution to an
avoidable loss.26 Comparative negligence displaced contributory negli-
gence, which entirely eliminated a faulty victim’s recovery.27 Thus,
one who is injured because of a speeding driver has her claim reduced
if she was not wearing a seat belt and the factfinder concludes that the
injury would have been less serious had the victim herself behaved
optimally. In the case of sexual misconduct, for example, imagine that
X assaults A, B, C, and D over a period of months. X is apprehended
after the assault on D—perhaps because it is quickly reported by D,
who is motivated by the reward system suggested here. X is then dis-
covered to have previously assaulted A, B, and C. These earlier vic-
tims would owe something to the victims who followed them in time;
A, for instance, has in a sense wronged B, C, and D.28 The idea does
not quite fit tort law because it would be unusual to be able to demon-
strate that A was more-likely-than not the cause of B, C, or D’s injury.
Nevertheless, if the nonreporting is found to be wrongful, then it is
more conventional to find A responsible, though far less so than X.
Among the problems with this version of punishing the victim who did
not report, is the fact that D may choose not to report because she
senses or knows that X is not a first-time offender. D may not want to
see a penalty inflicted on A and B, and she knows that X, most impor-
tantly, will be penalized. This is especially true for campus cases be-
cause D is likely to know A. Moreover, in some cases it is easier to find
X responsible for the assault on D precisely because earlier victims
come forward. Penalizing them would discourage their coming for-
ward in support of D’s claim. A, B, and C’s evidence will be found ad-
missible, even though it detracts from the usual requirement that a
claim against X for the harm done to D not be polluted by extrinsic
evidence, if there is reason to think that the testimony of earlier vic-
the risks of mass-media reporting of sexual assault, and their impact on victim
credibility).
26. Comparative-Negligence Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
27. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of
Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 919–20 (1981); Contributory-Negligence Doctrine,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
28. We expect some experiments with the age of non-reporting victims. Our focus has
been on university campuses, but if the idea is extended to assaults more gener-
ally, it is hard to imagine any penalty for children who do not report wrongs done
to them. Presumably, law would need to decide on an age of maturity in this
regard.
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tims shows a pattern.29 We leave for another day, or for the judgment
of universities, the interesting question of how to allocate damages (as
law must do when comparative negligence applies).
Given the interest in privacy and the reality of some victims’ disin-
clination to discuss or broadcast a bad experience, a penalty for non-
reporting might be limited to witnesses. If it is applied to outcry wit-
nesses, the victim may be disinclined to talk about her experience
with anyone, and may thus be harmed rather than helped. But it
quickly becomes clear that reporting is best motivated with carrots
rather than sticks. Title IX takes a step in the direction of mandatory
reporting by obligating certain faculty and administrators who hear of
an assault to take further steps; it does not require anything of the
victim herself.30 Nor does it directly impose a penalty on one who is
obliged to report but fails to do so.31 A noncomplying administrator
might expect to be disciplined by his or her employer, but it is unclear
whether a faculty member, motivated perhaps by the victim’s request
for total anonymity, would be penalized at all for valuing this request
over Title IX’s instruction. A Title IX coordinator who learns the name
of a victim is free to promise confidentiality.32 The coordinator will
normally communicate with the victim and ask her whether she
wants to pursue a complaint. If she does not wish to pursue a com-
plaint, she may avail herself of a counselor,33 but her identity will be
protected and no claim will be brought without her consent (unless
29. FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
30. See WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE TO PROTECT STUDENTS FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT, IN-
TERSECTION OF TITLE IX AND THE CLERY ACT (Apr. 2014), https://www.justice.gov/
ovw/page/file/910306/download [https://perma.unl.edu/Z439-23BW]; see also, e.g.,
Title IX Compliance Guide for Mandatory Reporters, PURDUE U., https://www
.purdue.edu/titleix/complianceGuide/index.html [https://perma.unl.edu/Q8K5-
N4H3] (describing the responsibilities of a mandated reporter under Title IX);
Title IX Mandated Reporting, U. MO. ST. LOUIS, https://www.umsl.edu/~safetyini-
tiatives/compliance/titleix.html [https://perma.unl.edu/6VN3-CDQM] (describing
what information must be reported to the Title IX Coordinator by a mandated
reporter).
31. Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018).
32. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 17; see also
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE
IX AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 18–19 (Apr. 29, 2014), https://www2.ed.gov/about/of-
fices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/CBL3-PANG]
(stating that OCR “strongly supports a student’s interest in confidentiality”), re-
scinded by U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 5.
33. Confidential counseling is typically available to victims at all stages, regardless
of reporting status. See, e.g., Confidential Counseling Resources, STAN. U., https://
titleix.stanford.edu/confidential-counseling-university-resources [https://perma
.unl.edu/89D9-R2X9] (describing available sources of counseling); Confidential
Support, NW. U. OFF. EQUITY, https://www.northwestern.edu/sexual-misconduct/
get-help/confidential-support.html [https://perma.unl.edu/QB5Q-BBJR] (listing
resources for confidential counseling and clarifying that use of counseling is not
equivalent to a formal report).
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disclosure and investigation are the only ways to ensure compliance
with Title IX generally).34 Still, it is unavoidable that any stick for
non-reporting by the victim or second-party observer may discourage
each from approaching a coordinator, faculty member, or other person
who could provide useful counsel. Every imaginable rule has costs as
well as benefits.
IV. DEALING WITH OBJECTIONS TO THE PLAN
A serious problem with the incentive scheme proposed here is that
it might be understood as suggesting that a sexual assault can be
monetized, when money cannot possibly make a victim truly whole.
On the other hand, this kind of objection is rarely made to discourage
or forbid life insurance or payments under tort law, even when a mur-
der or other wrongful death is at hand. In these settings, money is not
understood as a substitute for a life, but simply as compensation for
part of what is lost. In tort cases, it is also a deterrent regarding negli-
gent behavior and often a means of discouraging or raising the cost of
certain activities. In any event, the idea presented here does not re-
quire an insurance company; the incentive to report and to reduce
wrongdoing in the first place can be structured as a reward.35 It is a
reward paid by the university or another party, and it offers an incen-
tive to gather information and identify repeat offenders. The reward
to victims who report can be understood as payment to persons who
bear a huge cost when they bring claims or report misbehavior. The
idea is easily extended to areas where there is substantial under-re-
porting and where it gives no grounds for offense, including academic
dishonesty, shoplifting, and misbehavior in the workplace. If the in-
centive scheme were in place in these areas, it would seem offensive to
reward these reports, but not the reports of sexual misconduct—a
greater harm that also suffers from under-reporting.
One obvious problem is that an accused party will often claim that
a procedure is unfairly biased because the accuser or other witness
has been promised an incentive to give (even false) testimony. This is
one of the reasons that conventional criminal law does not permit
monetary payments to witnesses for the prosecution or for the defen-
dant.36 Somewhat mysteriously, or uneasily, the government is al-
lowed to give other kinds of rewards to helpful witnesses, including
promises of immunity, so long as these are revealed to the defendant
and to the factfinder.37 Following the lead of criminal law, our sugges-
34. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 17.
35. We shy away from suggesting a system in which individuals purchase insurance
because this offers no direct incentive for the universities.
36. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
37. See generally Saul Levmore & Ariel Porat, Asymmetries and Incentives in Plea
Bargaining and Evidence Production, 122 YALE L.J. 690 (2012).
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tion here is that any payment received by the accuser or a second-
party witness must be revealed to the factfinder.38 It may be that a
reward reduces the conviction rate or even increases the number of
questionable claims, but inasmuch as the rate of reporting is presently
low, it is almost surely the case that rewards will do more good than
harm. Indeed, the benefit of a reward system can be increased by in-
troducing some complexity to the proposal: a reward can be earned
only if the (professed) wrongdoing is reported within one month of its
occurrence or discovery. Such a timetable can be seen as a kind of stat-
ute of limitations, as it aims to give the factfinder access to fresher
evidence. The more important aim is to increase the expected benefit
of reducing the number or likelihood of further infractions by the ac-
cused. If the goal of the system is to reduce assaults, then the system
ought to encourage early reporting.
There is, unfortunately, the danger that a university will be less
likely to investigate a claim properly and find an accused responsible
if the same university must then pay the accuser or other witness. It
might, for example, appoint persons who are less inclined to believe
claims of wrongdoing to membership on its adjudicatory committees.
Similarly, it might devote insufficient resources to fact-finding. More
optimistically, the prospect of making payments might cause it to
monitor parties and invest in cameras in order to reduce assaults or
other wrongs in the first place, which would also increase the accuracy
of fact-finding if a claim is filed.
Still, a university that must pay for a creditable report of wrongdo-
ing is in a sense penalized for its own good behavior. If the reward
proposal succeeds, it will do so because it encourages reports, and thus
imposes costs on the very party that is often in the best position to
prevent harms (i.e., the university), but is now asked to adopt a kind
of strict liability system against its own interest. We do not expect
other private entities to adopt such systems, and governments give
themselves immunity against claims of negligence and rarely subject
themselves to strict liability simply because they are the least cost
avoiders. Nor do we often see payments as encouragement where the
activity in question imposes a substantial cost on another party. Thus,
it is hard to imagine a democratic country’s legal system tolerating
payments to its judges based on the number or percentage of convic-
tions they turn out. When there are incentive payments to govern-
ment officials, based for example on revenue extracted from citizens or
apprehensions of criminals or dangerous drivers, the accused are pro-
38. The Supreme Court has held that prosecutors must typically disclose incentives
given to a witness. See Christopher T. Robertson & D. Alex Winkelman, Incen-
tives, Lies and Disclosure, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 33, 43–44 (2017) (citing Giglio v.
United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153–55 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963) (parentheticals omitted)).
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tected by the legal system and able to appeal unfavorable findings.
These protections are rarely available to students who are found re-
sponsible for sexual misbehavior and other wrongs in university set-
tings. It may, therefore, be sensible to improve our proposal by
employing a third-party factfinder for each university that subscribes
to the plan.
It might seem that third parties, perhaps in the form of actual in-
surance companies, will regularly disbelieve or simply deny claims in
order to avoid the obligation to pay victims who report wrongdoing.
But, as with fire, auto, and other familiar kinds of insurance coverage,
the insurer does not have a strong incentive to turn down deserving
claimants because it profits in the long run by attracting more custom-
ers and earning a reputation as an honest investigator and reliable
payer.39 Following a learning period, some universities can be ex-
pected to advertise their relatively low (size-adjusted) insurance rates,
as these will indicate a safe environment that will attract applicants
and their parents. Moreover, and perhaps more controversially, if the
insurer and the university take steps to discover the identity of wrong-
doers and pay victims whose claims are verified or otherwise accepted,
students who see themselves as potential victims or as accused parties
may use their smart phones to record interactions. Some fraternities
already use cameras to record parties in order to discourage misbe-
havior and defend against unfair claims; students are accustomed to
allowable taping in stores (albeit typically with no sound recording,
given the lack of consent and restrictions imposed by state laws40).
These recordings could help prove cases where payment is due, and
they would deter misbehavior in the first place, even as they discour-
age false claims.
39. See, e.g., PAUL FRANCIS & SARAH BUTLER, CUTTING THE COST OF INSURANCE
CLAIMS & TAKING CONTROL OF THE PROCESS (Strategy& 2010), https://www.strate
gyand.pwc.com/media/file/Strategyand_Cutting-the-cost-of-insurance-claims.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/QZ48-GCUH]. Health insurance may be an exception to
this general rule. The high rate of employer-sponsored health insurance enroll-
ment, relatively low number of possible insurers, and tendency of employers to
prefer incumbent insurer relationships leads to an imperfectly competitive mar-
ket for health insurance. See generally Leemore S. Dafny, Are Health Insurance
Markets Competitive?, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 1399 (2010); see also Bryan Caplan,
Health Insurance and Reputation, LIBR. ECON. LIBERTY ECONLOG (July 27, 2009),
http://www.econlib.org/archives/2009/07/health_insuranc_7.html [https://perma
.unl.edu/7KGN-6AY4] (noting that “insurance companies that shirk their respon-
sibilities hurt their reputation”).
40. Federal law requires that at least one party to a conversation consent to its re-
cording. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2012); see also generally 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510–2522 (2012) (prohibiting intentional interception of “wire, oral, or elec-
tronic communications,” including “any aural transfer made in whole or in part
through . . . wire, cable, or other like connection,” as well as “any oral communica-
tion uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is
not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation”).
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V. FALSE CLAIMS AND PROTECTION FOR THE ACCUSED
It is easy to imagine a second, symmetrical kind of insurance
against false claims. It has been estimated that approximately 5% of
claims of sexual assault are false,41 and it is reasonable for a univer-
sity to insure individuals and fraternities against this risk. This insur-
ance has more elements of restitution than does the insurance
suggested for victims, and yet it provides the university with an incen-
tive to be aware of the danger of false claims and guard against them
with cameras, instructional sessions for new students, and by attach-
ing conditions to parties, various organizations, and campus activities.
It has the further advantage of encouraging fraternities and individu-
als themselves to welcome, rather than resist, monitoring. Nor is this
false claim insurance necessarily against the interest of the abused.
For one thing, if an insurance claim by an accused person or institu-
tion is denied, it will help show that a woman’s claim was indeed meri-
torious. For example, evidence that a fraternity normally records
activity in its public places, but suddenly claims that its cameras were
not functioning on the night cited in an allegation of misbehavior will
be held against the accused fraternity or member. Recordation, or
other steps taken to lower the cost of this insurance, will also send a
signal to members that misbehavior will be discovered. As far as we
know, there are not yet police departments or municipalities that fine
officers whose phones or cameras are found to have been disarmed,
but a university could impose such a rule on party organizers or indi-
viduals and certainly on those who are under probation because of
previous misbehavior.42
While there is no reason to think that false claims are a significant
problem in the case of sexual assault on college campuses, it is pru-
dent to think about the issue once one contemplates the idea of re-
warding reporters. It is dangerous to penalize claims that are
unproven or even that are thought to be wrongfully brought because
fact-finding is imperfect, as are recollections. There is the danger that
a penalty for a false or unsubstantiated claim will discourage the re-
porting of claims that are true and at the center of our concern here.
By way of contrast, the government may reward whistle-blowers who
turn in tax cheats, but there is no great social cost to being falsely
accused of tax fraud. The Internal Revenue Service may find a claim
credible (even if some are motivated by personal animus), but if it in-
spects the claim and finds no wrongdoing, there is no public informa-
tion and no great cost to the accused other than the cost of defending
against an accusation; the government is simply directed to a target it
41. Andre´ De Zutter et al., The Prevalence of False Allegations of Rape in the United
States from 2006–2010, 2 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL., Apr. 2010, at 1, 4.
42. This and other ideas suggested here, including taping and recording, might re-
quire statutory changes.
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might have inspected in the ordinary course of auditing. As far as we
know, no university actually penalizes students or employees who
bring claims of academic or sexual misbehavior that prove to be un-
warranted. It is common to have a general rule against lying, and per-
haps the threat of disciplinary action does some good.43 Universities
have reason to fear that any such penalty will cause an even lower
rate of reporting than is presently experienced.
If a fear of false claims is an obstacle to the introduction of re-
warding early reporting of wrongdoing, a novel means of discouraging
wrongful reporting might be implemented. Instead of being asked
whether sexual misbehavior occurred beyond a reasonable doubt, by
the preponderance of the evidence, or by a more-likely-than-not stan-
dard, a hearing committee might be asked to assign the claim to one of
three categories. For example, the committee might be asked whether
there is a greater than 50% chance that the accused violated the stan-
dard of behavior in place,44 whether the behavior was more than 25%
(but less than 50%) likely to have been in violation of this standard, or
whether it was quite unlikely (less than 25%) to be in violation. Only if
it finds the last of these three characterizations to be the case, would
the accuser be found to have wronged the accused party. And, of
course, we expect hearing committees to be very careful about finding
a claim to fall into this third category because they will then need to
impose some penalty on the complainant. It is obvious that even a
mild penalty45 might deter other reports, and many hearing officers
and committee members are likely to have volunteered or come to the
43. See, e.g., Standards and Discipline: Student Conduct and Community Standards,
COLUM. U. (Aug. 31, 2016, revised Nov. 1, 2016), http://www.columbia.edu/cu/
studentconduct/documents/SandDFall2016.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/7ELX-
8PDN]; Chapter 11: Student Discipline and Conduct, U. TEX. AUSTIN
(2017–2018), http://catalog.utexas.edu/general-information/appendices/appendix-
c/student-discipline-and-conduct/ [https://perma.unl.edu/V3GJ-STYZ]; UCI Office
of Academic Integrity & Student Conduct, Grounds for Discipline, U. CA., IRVINE
(2018), https://aisc.uci.edu/policies/pacaos/grounds-for-discipline.php [https://per
ma.unl.edu/7KKF-GSG7]. Occasionally a university will announce a rule against
lying in Title IX investigations or note that its general rule applies to Title IX
matters. Office of Diversity, Equity and Inclusion, Title IX FAQs, U. MO. SYS.
(Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.umsystem.edu/ums/dei/titleix/faqs#43 [https://per
ma.unl.edu/US2T-SNH9]; About Title IX UConn, U. CONN., https://titleix.uconn
.edu/title-ix-at-uconn/about-title-ix-uconn/ [https://perma.unl.edu/Z4AM-B5QS];
Sexual Misconduct Policy and Procedures, MISS. U. FOR WOMEN, http://www.muw
.edu/titleix/sexualmisconductpolicy [https://perma.unl.edu/7SUP-MQVZ].
44. A higher standard will do as well.
45. Penalties like those typically applied to code of conduct violations may seem most
appropriate here, as they would allow the university to escalate penalties for re-
peated false reports without unduly punishing innocent, but mistaken, reporters.
Examples include written warnings, temporary probation, or community service,
with the option to ban repeat offenders from campus residences or to mark their
transcripts with a conduct or honor code violation.
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business of these investigations and hearings with greater than aver-
age concern for the victims of sexual assault. In theory, most universi-
ties have a rule against lying to the factfinders in these cases, but in
practice no claim is brought against one thought to have provided
false testimony. Our own experience is that when claims are judged
not to meet the more-likely-than-not standard, it is nevertheless the
case that the claim was filed in good faith. The accuser genuinely be-
lieved that she did not give consent to a physical action or that she
was emotionally mistreated. If a claim is falsified by evidence derived
from cameras or mobile devices, the witness (or accuser) is generally
regarded as having faulty recall owing in part to alcohol or selective
memory brought on by various influences. These cases often lead to a
hearing and an instruction that the accused and accusing parties
maintain distance from one another, but they do not lead to any claim
against witnesses who are not believed after a review of the available
evidence. Still, the prospect of a reward to claimants, as proposed
here, might increase the number of misguided accusations, and might
lead to knowingly false claims against someone whom the accuser re-
sents. The accused might have misbehaved, but not in a way that can
be regarded as an assault or other serious wrongdoing. For example, a
factfinder might see evidence from camera surveillance that com-
pletely contradicts the accusation, and might therefore find that the
accusation is without merit. It is in such a case that a penalty might
be imposed on the claimant because the committee hearing the case
would find the claim only 0%–25% likely to be true. We do not think
this possibility will discourage anyone from reporting sexual assaults
or other wrongs, especially if a complaint can be withdrawn after the
accuser is shown the available evidence before a hearing takes place.
In short, it might be worth experimenting with modest penalties for
claims that are very likely to be false; however, this sort of experiment
is appropriate only if a system of rewards for meritorious claims is in
place.
Much of the discussion here can be understood as part of law’s
grappling with the choice between, or combined effectiveness of, car-
rots and sticks.46 It is often the case that carrots and sticks, or re-
wards and penalties, can be substitutes. Rather than rewarding those
who report sexual misconduct (or tax fraud or police misbehavior), law
could penalize those who do not report misbehavior. In the case of sex-
ual assault, this is unlikely to work well because all the involved par-
ties will gain from not reporting.47 In principle, one who observes A
46. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Carrots and Torts, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND
ECONOMICS 203 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000).
47. Senator Dianne Feinstein has introduced legislation establishing mandatory re-
porting, but it is not yet clear what the penalty would be for failure. See Press
Release, U.S. Senator for Cal. Dianne Feinstein, Senators Introduce Bill Requir-
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assaulting B might report the assault—motivated perhaps by the re-
ward suggested here—and also trigger a penalty against B, unless B
also reported the assault. B would presumably not be penalized if B
had been inebriated or otherwise unable to make a credible claim
against A. The idea seems unproductive inasmuch as the observer
might choose not to report the assault precisely because he or she will
know that the victim, B, is likely to be penalized for failing to report. B
will suffer the horror of an assault and the additional penalty for de-
clining to report. Law does not, for example, penalize store owners
who fail to report an attempted robbery, and the few jurisdictions that
have threatened to penalize victims of kidnapping threats if they pro-
ceed to deal with kidnappers directly without turning the case over to
the police have been unsuccessful.48 It is politically and morally unat-
tractive to charge someone who suffered at the hands of another for
subsequently failing to report. Moreover, the line between socially dis-
approved “snitching” and serving others by reporting wrongdoing is
difficult to draw.
What about anonymous reporting? Many universities offer stu-
dents a means of anonymously reporting assault, and a well-known
website, Callisto, offers anonymous reporting as well.49 One idea of
Callisto-style systems is that a victim might be more inclined to report
the wrong done to her if she sees that the perpetrator has previously
been accused of misbehavior.
Anonymity presents grave problems. Thus, anonymity on the In-
ternet appears to encourage bad behavior, and often in a form that
ing U.S. Amateur Athletic Organizations, Members to Report Sexual Abuse (Mar.
6, 2017), https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2017/3/senators-intro
duce-bill-requiring-u-s-amateur-athletic-organizations-members-to-report-sexu
al-abuse [https://perma.unl.edu/KFY2-5DV8]. Title IX establishes mandatory re-
porting, but with no sanctions it is best understood as aspirational. See WHITE
HOUSE TASK FORCE TO PROTECT STUDENTS FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT, supra note 30
(describing sexual harassment and sexual violence as incidents which “must be
reported to school officials”).
48. Italy, for example, banned recipients of kidnapping threats from paying ransom
or negotiating with kidnappers, going so far as to freeze available assets in the
wake of a kidnapping. Despite these measures, ransom payments continued. See
Celestine Bohlen, Italian Ban on Paying Kidnappers Stirs Anger, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 1, 1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/01/world/italian-ban-on-paying-
kidnappers-stirs-anger.html.
49. Callisto’s most recent impact report indicates that victims of sexual assault who
visited the Callisto site were five times more likely to report their assault to the
authorities, and even those Callisto users who do not report often enter into
“matching”—a system by which Callisto reaches out individually to suggest re-
porting when multiple users report the same assailant. See CALLISTO, YEAR 2 OF
COMBATING SEXUAL ASSAULT, EMPOWERING SURVIVORS, AND ADVANCING JUSTICE,
2016–2017 SCHOOL YEAR REPORT (2017), https://www.projectcallisto.org/Callisto_
Year_2_highres.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/3UPG-6GBY].
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targets women.50 In general, anonymity encourages impulsive and at
times irresponsible behavior on the Internet, on bathroom walls, and
in various other settings. Anonymous reporting is the enemy of valua-
ble accountability even as it is likely to encourage useful reporting.
The familiar compromise is probably the right place to start: a third
party, like a Title IX officer, must know the identity of the reporter. It
is plain that accusations made on Callisto or on bathroom walls have
lower credibility than those made openly or to officials who can moni-
tor false accusations. Entirely anonymous accusations should not be
rewarded. The criminal law system has long worked with this compro-
mise: victims of sexual assault are shielded from media publicity,
while their identity is known to those who take part in investigations
and in any trial.
VI. CONCLUSION
Wrongdoing is often unreported, and it is hard to imagine a world
in which all wrongdoing is reported because of carrots, sticks, or cul-
tural norms. In such a world, one would never want to offer a ride,
invite a guest to dine, or choose to employ a human when a machine
could do the job. But some wrongs are sufficiently serious (and likely
to become a habit if not penalized) that the legal system should en-
courage reporting. This is likely to be the case where the victim gains
little from reporting because the wrong to her has already been done.
A storekeeper has more reason to report an armed robbery than does
the victim of a sexual assault. This Article examined the possibility of
encouraging reports with rewards and penalties and explained why
rewards are superior to penalties. Where the current practice is to of-
fer neither a carrot nor a stick, a reward system is worth trying. The
problems introduced by a reward system can probably be offset with
other rules. The plan suggested here involves a kind of insurance pol-
icy for both victims and falsely accused persons. It is time to experi-
ment with these ideas for reducing sexual assaults on campus and
perhaps for reducing other wrongs as well.
50. See Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum, Introduction, in THE OFFENSIVE IN-
TERNET: PRIVACY, SPEECH, AND REPUTATION 1 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nuss-
baum eds., Harvard Univ. Press, 2010); see also Saul Levmore, The Internet’s
Anonymity Problem, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: PRIVACY, SPEECH, AND REPUTA-
TION, supra, at 50 (discussing anonymity in both sections).
